Abstract. We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other players' behaviors. Assuming the continuity of the payoff functions in time, we show that there always exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in pure stopping strategies for any ǫ > 0.
can be adjusted according to other players' actions. By assuming U i is uniformly continuous in (t 1 , . . . , t N ), we show that the game always admits an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for any ǫ > 0.
We prove the result by an induction on the number of the players. That is, we construct an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the N -player game from the ǫ-Nash equilibriums of (N − 1)-player games as well as ǫ-saddle points of some zero-sum games. To reduce the burden of the notation, we only focus on the three-player case (N = 3), and the proof still works accordingly for the case with more players.
Our game has a wide range of applications, e.g., when companies choose times to take actions, and e.g., when investors who both short and long American options try to maximize their utilities.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide the setup and the main result. In Section 3, we provide some auxiliary results. In section 4, we use these auxiliary results to construct an ǫ-equilibrium for the original game.
Setup and the main result
In this section, we will provide the general setup and the main result. Theorem 2.6 is the main result of this paper.
Let (Ω, F, (F t ) t∈[0,∞] , P) be a filtered probability space, where F = F ∞ and (F t ) t∈[0,∞] satisfies the usual conditions. To avoid the technical difficulties stemming from the verification of path regularities of some related processes, we assume that Ω is at most countable, and P is supported on Ω. Let T be the set of stopping times. For ρ ∈ T , denote T ρ (resp. T ρ+ ) be the set of stopping times that is no less (resp. strictly greater) than ρ on {ρ < ∞}. Definition 2.1. Let N ∈ N and I be the set of all the subsets of {1, . . . , N − 1}. A 2 N −1 -tuple ρ ρ ρ = (ρ α ) α∈I is said to be a stopping strategy (of order N ), if ρ := ρ ∅ ∈ T , and for any I = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) ⊂ {1, . . . , N − 1} with i 1 < . . . < i n ,
and
Denote T N as the set of stopping strategies of order N . For σ ∈ T , let
The interpretation of ρ ρ ρ ∈ T N is as follows. Suppose there are N players, and each of them needs to choose a time to make a decision (stop). Let ρ ρ ρ be player N 's stopping strategy. At the beginning, player N chooses an initial stopping time ρ. If no other players stop before ρ, then player N stops at time ρ. Otherwise, player N observes someone stops before ρ. Say, it is player 1 who stops first at time t < ρ. Then player N observes player 1's action, and immediate switches to strategy ρ 1 (t). In general, ρ i 1 ,... ,in (t 1 , . . . , t n , ·) represents the strategy that player N uses, if she has not stopped by time t 1 ∨ . . . ∨ t n , and she observes that players i 1 , . . . , i n have stopped at time t 1 , . . . , t n respectively. Let ρ ρ ρ i ∈ T N , i = 1, . . . , N , which presents the stopping strategy for player i in an N -player game. Denote ρ ρ ρ i [ρ ρ ρ −i ] as the actual time when player i stops under the other players' stopping strategies ρ ρ ρ −i := (ρ ρ ρ 1 , . . . , ρ ρ ρ i−1 , ρ ρ ρ i+1 , . . . , ρ ρ ρ N ). Due to the complexity of the notation, we will not explicitly write out the expression of ρ ρ ρ i [ρ ρ ρ −i ]. Instead, we give two examples when N = 2 and N = 3.
where ρ 23 (τ, σ) := ρ 23 (τ (·), σ(·), ·).
We make the following standing assumption throughout this paper. 
Now for any θ ∈ T , consider the N -player stopping game in continuous time
where
Here player i chooses the stopping strategy ρ ρ ρ i to maximize her own utility U i . Recall the definition of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
N is said to be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (in pure stopping strategies) for the game (2.1), if for any ρ ρ ρ 1 , . . . , ρ ρ ρ N ∈ T N θ ,
Below is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumption 2.4, there are exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game (2.1) for any ǫ > 0.
Remark 2.7. Our game can also be adapted to the case when each player has multiple stopping. For example, suppose each player has double stopping. Then we can treat player i as new players 2i − 1 and 2i, and letŨ 2i−1 :=Ũ 2i := U i . Of course, by doing so, a Nash equilibrium in the new game may not be optimal for each player in the old game. (Recall that it is possible that a Nash equilibrium (x * , y * ) for f i (x, y) = f (x, y), i = 1, 2 may not be optimal for sup x,y f (x, y).)
We will prove Theorem 2.6 by an induction on the number of players. We will construct an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the N -player game from ǫ-Nash equilibriums of (N − 1)-player games, as well as some ǫ-saddle points of some related zero-sum games. By [19, Theorem 2.4] , Theorem 2.6 holds when N = 2. (Although in [19] the game starts from time t = 0, but the proof there still works if the game starts at any stopping time.) To reduce the burden of the notation, we will only prove the result when N = 3. It can be seen later on that our proof also works for general N , as long as we assume that Theorem 2.6 holds for N − 1.
We will first provide some auxiliary results in the next section.
Some auxiliary results
In this section, we provide some auxiliary results in preparation for the proof of Theorem 2.6 when N = 3. Some of the proofs may admit simpler solutions, yet we demonstrate them in such ways in order to let the proofs also work for N > 3. It is worth noting that as Ω is at most countable, those results that hold w.r.t. any t ∈ [0, ∞] also hold w.r.t. any θ ∈ T . 
is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game
Proof. For any ǫ > 0, let h > 0 such that η(h) < ǫ. Now for any t ∈ [0, ∞), by [19, Theorem 2.4] , there exists an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ρ ρ ρ * = (ρ * , ρ * 1 ), τ τ τ * = (τ * , τ * 1 )) ∈ (T t ) 2 for the game
Letρ ρ ρ := (ρ * ,ρ 1 ) andτ τ τ := (τ * ,τ 1 ), wherê
and thus
This implies that
Conversely, for any ρ, τ ∈ T t , let
∞, otherwise, and
is F r∨s∨t -measurable and satisfies Assumption 2.4. Then for any ǫ > 0, there exists h > 0, such that for any t ∈ [0, ∞), there exists
That is, for any δ ∈ [0, h],
Proof. For any ǫ > 0, let h > 0 such that η(h) < ǫ. Fix t ∈ [0, ∞). By Lemma 3.2,
This implies that (ρ ρ ρ,τ τ τ ) ∈ (T 2 t ) 2 is a 5ǫ-optimizer for g t−δ in (3.2) for any δ ∈ [0, h].
is F s∨t -measurable and satisfies Assumption 2.4. Then for any ǫ > 0, there exists h > 0, such that for any t ∈ [0, ∞), there existsρ ∈ T t such that for any δ ∈ [0, h],ρ is an ǫ-optimizer for
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Lemma 3.3 and thus we omit it here.
is F r∨s∨t -measurable and satisfies Assumption 2.4. Then for t ≥ 0,
Moreover, the process (f t ) t≥0 is right continuous.
Proof. The equality in (3.4) follows from [19, Proposition 3.3] . Now fix t ∈ [0, ∞) and let t n ց t with |t n − t| < 1/n. For any ǫ > 0, by Lemma 3.1, there exists h > 0 and (ρ ρ ρ,τ τ τ ) ∈ (T 2 t ) 2 , such that for any δ ∈ [0, h], (ρ ρ ρ,τ τ τ ) ∈ (T 2 t ) 2 is an ǫ-saddle point for the game f t−h , i.e., for any ρ ρ ρ, τ τ τ ∈ T 2 t−δ ,
Then for n large enough such that |t n − t| < h, we have that 
Since the process (E t+s
By the arbitrariness of ǫ, lim n→∞ f tn = f t , and thus the conclusion follows.
is F r∨s∨t -measurable and satisfies Assumption 2.4. Then the process (g t ) t≥0 defined by
is right continuous.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Lemma 3.5 and thus we omit it here. Then for any µ ∈ T ,
where for t ≥ 0,
, and
Moreover, there exists an ǫ-saddle point for (3.5) with t replaced by µ for any ǫ > 0.
Proof. Denote
Similarly, we can show that X t ≤ Y 3 t . Hence,
Moreover, by Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, (X t ) t≥0 and (Y t ) t≥0 are right continuous. Then from the classical theory of Dynkin games, we have that for t ≥ 0,
and the process (V t ) t≥0 is right continuous. Now fix µ ∈ T and let ǫ > 0. Defineρ,θ ∈ T µ aŝ
Then (ρ,θ) ∈ (T µ ) 2 is an ǫ-saddle point for the Dynkin game V µ defined in (3.7) with t replaced by µ. By Lemma 3.3, there exists h x > 0 such that for any t ≥ 0, there exists (τ τ τ
. Similarly, by Lemma 3.1, there exists h y > 0, such that for t ≥ 0, there exist (ρ ρ ρ
t ,τ 3 t,1 )) ∈ (T 2 t ) 2 being ǫ-saddle points for Y 2 t ′ and Y 3 t ′ respectively for any t ′ ∈ [t − h y , t]. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.4 there exists h z > 0 such that for any t ≥ 0, there existρ 23 t ,τ 13 t ,σ 12 t ∈ T t being ǫ-optimizers for
respectively for any t ′ ∈ [t − h z , t]. Let h := h x ∧ h y ∧ h z , and
Observe that φ t (·) is right continuous and φ h (t) > t for t < ∞. Recallρ defined in (3.8). Now defineρ ρ ρ = (ρ,ρ 2 ,ρ 3 ,ρ 23 ),τ τ τ = (τ ,τ 1 ,τ 3 ,τ 13 ),σ σ σ = (σ,σ 1 ,σ 2 ,σ 12 ) as follows.τ
It can be shown thatρ ρ ρ,τ τ τ ,σ σ σ ∈ T 3 µ . In the rest of the proof, we will show that (ρ ρ ρ, (τ τ τ ,σ σ σ)) is a 17ǫ-saddle point for (3.5) with t replaced by µ. Part 1. We show that
where V is defined in (3.7). We consider five cases.
Case 1.2: A 2 := {ρ =θ} ∩ A. It can be shown that for any t ≥ 0,
for any t ′ ∈ [t − h, t], and ρ i,23 t ∈ T t being an ǫ-optimizer for
for any t ′ ∈ [t − h, t] for i = 2, 3, and τ i,13 t ∈ T t being an ǫ-optimizer for
for any t ′ ∈ [t − h, t] for i = 1, 3, and σ i,12 t ∈ T t being an ǫ-optimizers for
is a martingale w.r.t. the filtration (F t+s ) s≥0 satisfying the usual conditions, it is right continuous. By Lemmas 3.6 and 4.2, we have that for i = 1, 2, 3, the process (V i t ) t≥0 is right continuous. Then we can choose δ > 0 being F θ -measurable, such that for i = 1, 2, 3,
It can be shown that for any λ ∈ T θ , λ + δ ∈ T θ+ . ), τ τ τ 3 = (τ 3 τ 3 1 , τ 3 3 , τ 3 13 ))) ∈ (T 3 µ 3 +δ ) 3 being an ǫ-saddle point for the game sup σ σ σ∈T 3
By Proposition 3.7, there exist
. φ h (t) , on B ∩ {s = t = µ 2 }, σ 1 φ h (s),2 (t), on F ∩ {s ≤ t}, σ 2 φ h (t),1 (s), on F ∩ {s > t},
and D (resp. E, F ) is the complement of the first four cases in the definition ofρ 23 (resp.τ 13 ,σ 12 ). It can be shown thatρ ρ ρ,τ τ τ ,σ σ σ ∈ T 3 θ . The next result shows that (ρ ρ ρ,τ τ τ ,σ σ σ) is a 13ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game (2.1) when N = 3. In particular, Theorem 2.6 holds for N = 3. Proposition 4.3. (ρ ρ ρ,τ τ τ ,σ σ σ) ∈ (T 3 θ ) 3 is a 13ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game (2.1) for N = 3.
Proof. First, we have that 
